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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
CARLOS JOHNSON,
ReszJOndent,
Case No.
7988

vs.
~. ~L

COVEY,
Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATE~fENT

OF FACTS

This appeal arises out of a claim made by respondent
to a part of the proceeds received by appellant fron1
the sale of certain drill pipe.
The trial court awarded respondent a judgrnent in
the sum of $1788.42, which represented 25.17% of the
net proceeds received by appellant from the pipe sold.
From this judg1nent appellant appealed.
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Appellant's State1nent of Facts does not accurately,
fairly or completely state the facts which Judge Joseph
G. Jeppson had before hi1n in considering this ca:-;e.
For purposes of clarification and conciseness respondent
will therefore restate the facts which are supported by
the evidence and upon which the Court made

it~ Finding-~

of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree.
Respondent and appellant were owners of percentage interests in the Benjamin Slaugh Oil \Veil Lease
upon which Baird & Robbins ( 0mpany, drilling opera1

tors, were to drill a well. The leased

premi:-;e~

were near

Vernal, rtah (Exhibit "B").
Respondent and appellant are both residents of

~alt

Lake Cit:,, Utah.
The well was drilled in the early spring of

19-l-~),

tlw

first pipe for use in the drilling being placed on the :-;itP
in January of 1949 (Exhibit "5'', R. 38). By .July of
1949 it became apparent to the percentage holder:-; that
the well was a dry hole and drilling ceased (R. 1-l-).

The first drill pipe used in the drilling of the well
was furnished by the Covey interest, one of whom wa:-;
S. ~~. Covey. They purchased and delivered to the well
site 501-+ feet of drill pipe to be used in the drilling of
the Benjamin Slaugh well. This pipe was secondhand,
-+% inch drill pipe (R. 28, ~9, Exhibit .. 5"). The pipt-
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furnished by CoYey~ was to remain their property under
the terms of a certain agree1nent, which is Exhibit "5".
Paragraph XI C states as follows:
'"Operator agrees to store said pipe upon the
pren1ises described in paragraph nun1bered 1 of
'Descriptions' in a pile identified as the pipe of
CoYeys and to protect said pipe from injury or
theft other than acts of God, the public enen1y
or conditions beyond the control of operator and
to account to Coveys for said pipe at all times
and upon request of Coveys to 1nake written
report of pipe in stock pile and in use by
operator.''

It is apparent frmu the terms of Exhibit "5" that
the pipe furnished by Coveys was to be used in the
drilling of nwre than one well, and Baird & Robbins, a
drilling partnership, was to keep an account of the pipe.
The 501-! feet of pipe thus furnished was used in the
drilling of the Slaugh well. During the drilling there
occurred several twist-offs or breaks in the pipe while
the first 501-1- feet of pipe was in use (R. 30, 31). No
accounting for the 501-1 feet of pipe was ever made by
Baird & Robbins (R. 119, 120). After the 5014 feet of
pipe had been completely used, Baird & Robbins borrowed from Kerr-:McGee Drilling Company approximately 600 feet of pipe, which was used to continue with
the drilling ( R. 32).
At the tinte the Kerr-McGee pipe was borrowed
there had been a twist-off and all of the first 5014 feet
of pipe furnished by Coveys had been used up. When
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the whipstock, which is a device to drill around the point
in the well where drill pipe has been lost, was comInenced, the hole was at 4700 feet and the Kerr-:\fcGee
pipe was put to use (R. 47). It wa~ admitted by appellant that some of his pipe was lost in drilling, the amount
he was unable to state (R. 118). In April, 1949 respondent, Carlos Johnson, was approached hy Baird & Robbins
and he agreed to purchase for u~e in the well an additional 1586 feet of pipe. This pipe was -!~,-:! inch, secondhand drill pipe. It was identically. the same kind of pipe
as had been furnished for the drilling by appellant (R.
36). Respondent purchased the pipe \Yith a cashier's
eheck from the First Security Bank of :\[agna. The
check was made directly to Cobb & :--;tringer Drilling
Cmnpany, from whmn the pipe was purchased (R. -tS).
Thereafter, respondent was offered an additional interest in the Slaugh well for the pipe. The offer was contained in Exhibit "D". It was signed by Baird & Robhins
but was not satisfactory to respondent and was never
accepted by him. Instead he was given a promissory
note, a eopy of which is marked Exhibit ":2". The promis~ory note did not contain all of the agreement between
Baird & Robbins and respondent. It did recite that the
pipe purchased by respondent was to remain on the
Slaugh lease until the prmnissory note was paid. The
note was never paid nor did respondent sell, trade or
release the pipe which he had purchased (R. 50). Tt
was respondent's understanding that he was to retain
title to and the ownership of the pipe to protect himself
against loss (R. 72-75, 78, 79). Pnder cross-examination
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respondent concisely stated his understanding of the
pipe transaction with Baird:
.. A. He said he would either buy the pipe
off of rne or see that I got the pipe back." (R. 75,
lines 13, 1-t).

It. was also the understanding of l\1. E. Baird, of Baird
& Robbins, that the pipe was to rernain the property of
respondent until paid for (p. 13, 1\I. E. Baird deposition).
The language of Exhibit ''C" further demonstrates the
interest of respondent in the pipe in the following
language:
·· * * * This rnoney is to be used for the
purchase of 1586 ft. of drill pipe and to be purchased in Oklahmna City, Oklahmna. It is further
agreed by Baird and Robbins Drilling Cmnpany,
Inc., that the said 1586 ft. of drill pipe will remain
on the Benjarnin Slaugh lease and with the drilling unit, located in Yernal, Utah until the total
an1otmt of loan is paid in full."
Neither appellant nor any other person makes any claim
to the drill pipe bought from Cobb & Stringer by
respondent for use in the drilling of the well.
On October 11, 1949, the interest holders 1n the
Slaugh lease met at the office of Lynn Richards and
there discussed the status of the lease, possible further
development of the lease, whether or not the hole which
had been drilled should be abandoned, and the claims
of ownership in the Baird & Robbins equipment. Edward
Casey was appointed secretary of the meeting and made
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a 1ninute, which is Exhibit "B". The minute recites that
respondent, the witness l{arren, witness Ruckenbrod,
lawyer Richard L. Bird, Theron S. Covey, S. G. CoYey,
the appellant, F. l{. Gilroy and Lynn Richards, were
present at the meeting. It also recites as follows:
"The following are claims of ownership m
the equipment as known by the group:
Coveys own the drill pipe

5014'

Carlos Johnson drill pipe

1600'

Dr. Jellison & Kuhe, own the
reverse clutch
Trucks & Cars held hy Freed Finance Co."
\Vitness Karren, respondent and appellant's witness, Ruckenbrod, all recalled the claim hy respondent
to a part of the drill pipe (R. 39, 52, 92).
Someti1ne after the meeting of October 11th respondent discussed with Theron Covey the question of the
drill pipe (R. 52, 53), his first conservation being in
.January or February of 1950. Respondent recalls that
the following was the gist of the conservation (R. 53):
"A. Well, I asked what he was going to do
about that drill pipe, and he said well, they had
alread~· taken it down out of the rig and then says
it run around $1000., and I said, 'Whatever tlw
expenses are, I want to pay my share.' He said,
''Vell, we will work something out.' "
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Thereafter, respondent contacted the Coveys on
several occasions. At no time did they deny his ownership of the pipe (R. 5-1). However, he was unable to
obtain an accounting or state1nent concerning what had
been done with the pipe (R. 55).
On or about the lOth day of September, 1951 the
Covey Petroleun1 Corporation sold 5282 feet of drill
pipe located on the Slaugh lease to the Clark Drilling
Company and received for said pipe $7,920.37. rrhe
Clark Drilling Cmnpany renwved from the well site all
of the drill pipe which was then located at the well
(Exhibit '"G", R. 111, 112).
The drill pipe was taken out of the well in 90-foot
lengths and stacked in the rig at the time the well was
finished and the drilling stopped, and on October 11,
1949, the pipe which had been ren1oved was still stacked
in the rigging at the well site (R. 39). There was no
accurate count of the pipe made at the time it was
stacked in the rig.
The well was drilled to a depth of 5882 feet and it
would have been necessary to remove from the well
that amount of pipe at the time the well was abandoned
(R. 11-1, 115). On March 6, 1950, appellant hired one
C. :t\1. Chrisley to take the pipe that was standing in the
rig down and disn1antle it. This necessitated bringing
onto the well site equipn1ent which would handle the
90-foot lengths and haul the individual pipes as they
were separated (R. 134, 135 ). Chrisley took the pipe
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down out of the rig, dismantled it so that it would be
reduced from 90-foot lengths to 30-foot lengths and
stacked the pipe near the rig. No record of the amount
of pipe dismantled was presented, and as far as could
be ascertained, was not kept. Chrisley was the agent
and employee of the appellant and it was Theron S.
Covey's testimony that without authorization from him
or anyone else he removed a part of the pipe from the
well site. The court found that the evidence indicated
that Chrisley removed some pipe without authority. The
pile of pipe which Chrisley made was removed by the
Clark Drilling Company when it purchaf'ed the 5:28:2 feet.
~Ir.

Benjamin Slaugh, the owner of the property on
which the well was drilled, had been requested by the
Nheriff of rintah County to watch the drilling machinery and equipment and was hired by appellant to watch
the drill pipe after it was removed from the drilling
rig (R. 131, 132). There was only one pile of pipe made
hy Chrisle:, when the pipe was removed from the rigging (R. 135, 136). None of the pipe was removed from
the pile after Slaugh was employed to watch it (H. 137),
except under orders from Theron Covey when the pipe
1

was sold to the Clark Drilling Company. The ( 1ark
Drilling Company removed all of the pipe that was on
the well site on orders of CovP:' (R. 137, 138).
A mathematical recapitulation of the pipe situation
shows the following:
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Purchased by CoYey8, January, 1949.... 501-t feef
Lost by twist-off8 and attrition prior
to delivery of Johnson pipe ________________ 300 feet
On ~and at ti1ne of receipt of Johnson
p1pe ---------------------------------------------------------- -±71-t feet
Received frmn Johnson ---------------------------- 1586 feet
Total drill pipe on drill site after
tT ohnson pipe was delivered________ 6300 feet
Proportion owned by Johnson ________________ 1586 feet
6300 or
25.17%
Pipe sold by Theron Covey, October,
1951 ---------------------------------------------------------- 5282 feet
Gros~ proceeds fron1 pipe --------------------------$7,920.37
Co~t of sale and storage -----------------------------815.00

Xet proceeds from sale ------------------------$7,105.30
Respondent's prorata share
($7,105.30 X 25.17 7c) ----------------------------$1,788.42
The Court found on the basis of the evidence presented that respondent ·was the owner of the 1586 feet
of pipe purchased fron1 Cobb & Stringer; that said pipe
became confused with appellant's pipe and that the
prorata ownership of all of the pipe which was on the
well site at the tin1e the well was finished was 25.17%
for respondent and 74.83o/o for appellant. It decreed
that the $815.00 cost of sale, storage and delivery of
the confused pipe be divided in accordance with the prorata ownership of the pipe.
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Appellant cites as the basis for his appeal two
propositions. First, that the Carlos Johnson pipe did
not belong to him, and second, that the Court erred in
refusing to recognize the doctrine of confusion of good~.

STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED OX
POIN'T I.
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS BEYOND DOUBT THAT
RESPONDENT WAS THE OWNER OF 1586 FEET OF PIPE
USED IN THE DRILLING OF THE BENJAMIN SLAUGH
WELL.

POINT II.
RESPONDENT AND APPELLANT WERE PROPERLY
AWARDED PRORATA SHARES OF THE TOTAL CONFUSED PIPE SOLD.
ARGU~iENT

POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS BEYOND DOUBT THAT
RESPONDENT WAS THE OWNER OF 1586 FEET OF PIPE
USED IN THE DRILLING OF THE BENJAMIN SLAUGH
\VELL.

The evidence presented by all partie:-; coneermng
ownership of the pipe was not in conflict at any point.
It was undisputed that 1586 feet of pipe was purchased
hy a $2500.00 cashier's check which respondent furnished
to Baird & Robbins. This pipe, it i:-; undisputed, wa:-;
delivered to the Benjamin Slaugh lease and was there
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used in the drilling of the well in which respondent and
appellant were percentage owner~. It is undisputed that
respondent did not sell, dispose of or pledge the pipe
which he had furnished and that it was his understanding
that the pipe wa~ to remain his property. It was the
understanding of Baird & Hobbins, the drillers, that
the pipe \Ht::' the property of(_ arlos Johnson.
1

This i::' not the situation of appellant claiining that
the Carlos Johnson pipe belonged to hi1n. There is no
claiin to that pipe n1ade by any person other than
respondent. Judge Jeppson found that the pipe wa~
purchased by Baird & Robbins as the agent of respondent and further found that the title to the pipe at all
times remained in respondent. The drill pipe was
exeinpted by the foreclosure proceedings instituted by
the Sheriff of 1~intah County.
Respondent repeatedly testified that he was the
owner of the pipe. Baird testified he assumed that Johnson owned the pipe. In addition we have Johnson making claim to the pipe before any dispute ever arose.
Legal title,

a~

1ne1nbers of the legal profession

understand that tern1, is a concept which is not clearly
retained in the Ininds of lay1nen. While they understand the general idea that they are the owners of certain
propert~',

they do not carefully keep separate and apart

the title concept when the possession of the property and
ib use is granted to another. There can be no dispute
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but that respondent was to haYe his money returned
to hiln or the pipe which he had purchased. ruder the~e
circumstances title and the security furnished hy the
pipe were expected b)T all parties to be held and retained
h.v respondent.

It seems nearly a univer:-;ally accepted principle
that a \Vitness llla)' testify as to who i:' the owner of
personal propert)· where the facts are within his knowledge. Jantzen c. Emanuel German Baptist Church, :27
Okla. -173, 11:2 Pac. 1127 ~ Ft. ,")IJ!ith & W. R. Co. r.
Winston, 40 Okla, 173, 136 Pac. 107;); ~'-J'Jmrks r. Galena
Nat. Bank, 68 l{an. 148, 7-1 Pac. 619; illeudocino Couuty
v. Barnard, 57 Cal. App. :2d +50, 1:3+ P. :2d Sl+.
Title and ownership, a~ i~ pointed out in the cited
\\·here personal property is involved i~ ordinarii~·
a simple fact clearly within the knowledge of the owner
or witness.
<·a~P~,

It would have been

unju~t

enrichment for the trial

court to decree that appellant, who

doe~

pipe, should be given the proceeds from it.
purchased the

pi~pe

not own the
Ht>~pondent

and he has never transferred or

relinquished it to anyone else. The title and ownership
of the pipe, as the trial court found,

wa~ hi~.

It is submitted that under the evidence, the law and
equities applicable in this case that respondent is the
owner and entitled to all the henefi t~ of ownership in
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the 1;)~(i feet of drill pipe which he furnished on the
Benjamin ~laugh lease and a portion of which was sold
hy appellant.

POINT II.
RESPONDEXT AND APPELLANT WERE PROPERLY
AWARDED PRORATA SHARES OF THE TOTAL CONFl.SED PIPE SOLD.
Appellant

state~ a~

Point :2 of his Brief the follow-

mg:

"The l'ourt erred in refusing to recognize the
doctrine of confusion of goods."
Respondent i~ mnazed at this statement since it appears
from a cursory examination of the law that the Court
applied the doctrine of confusion of goods. Perhaps
what i~ meant hy Point :2 of appellant's brief is that the
Court did not forfeit the interest of respondent in the
confused goods. The doctrine which appellant seeks
to apply being the one which is applied where the confusion is fraudulent. There the fraudulent confuser
loses all of his interest in the confused goods because
of his attempted fraud.
The rule is without dissent that where the confusion
1s non-tortious but results frmn an innocent or negligent intermingling of goods which cannot be separated
and are of unifonn quality, no one forfeits his interest,
hut the owners are tenants in common.

The~·

share the
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losses prorata and are entitled to their prorata ~hare
of the confused goods. This has always been the law
of the State of Utah. It wa:s first announced in j[anti
City Savings Bank r. Peterson et al., 33 ITtah 209, :2:.W.
93 Pae. 566. In the Petersou case the confusion occurred
when one Thomp~on leased sheep from a number of persons and then gave a chattel mortgage to the ~lanti City
Savings Bank on 1600 head of sheep. Part of the slwep
mortgaged were those in which Thomp~on's only intere~t
was that of a lessee. r:rhompson then died and the hank
attmnpted to foreclose it:.- chattel mortgage on all of the
sheep in the Thompson herd. The sheep were ~imilarl~
marked with Thompson's earmark and branded with
his wool brand. It wa:-; a simple easP of confusion of
chattels. The nuious lessors and the mortp;ageP WPre
unable to seg-regate and :-;eparate their particular property. The Supreme Court of rtah clearly and succinctly
sets forth the law applicable from whieh there i:-; no
dissent in the decided ea~e~:

" * * * If the sheep which the defendant~
had leased werP mixed with the shPPJ> of the
deceased so as to be incapable of identification,
the deceased and the defendant:.;, a:-; to tlw herd,
became tenants in common. \Ylmtever intPrP~t
the deceased as such tenant in common had in and
to the herd the plaintiff succeeded to under it:-;
mortgage. Generally o1w tenant in cmmtwn eannot maintain replevin again:-;t his co-tenant for
hi~ individual interest in the common property.
Such undoubtedly i~ the rule where tlw eoBllllOil
propel't~· consists of a :-;pp(·ifie ('hattel or a :-;ing]P
pieee of pro pert~·. a:-; wa:-; the <·a:-;p in Hill r.
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Sca_<Jcr, 3 Ctah 379, 3 Par. 5-15, or where the
things in their nature are so far indivisible that
the share of one is not susceptible of delivery
without the whole. But it has been frequently
held that the rule should not obtain in a case
where the intermingled property is alike in quality and value and readily divisible by measureInent or "-eig·ht. It has been quite generally held
that tenants in rommon, or persons who are
~epara te owners of articles stored in rnass, such
as corn, wheat, coal, logs, etc., each article being
of like nature and quality with the others, may
haYe replevin for his proportionate part of the
intermixed chattels if the same is wrongfully
detained and the action is necessary for the maintenance of his rights, subject to deductions for
any loss or waste properly falling to his share
u-lzile the property remained in mass. (20 Am. &
Eng. Eney. Law, 493, and cases; Shinn on
Replevin, sec. 183, and cases.)

"If the testimony of the defendants is true,
and the sheep were intermingled and incapable of
identification, they and the plaintiff at the tirne
of its demand were tenants in common, but before
it was entitled to maintain the action it was necessary to show that the property was alike in
quality and value; was easily divisible; that the
defendants asserted ownership to the entire herd,
or attempted to remove or convert the common
property, or otherwise wrongfully held it antagonistic and hostile to the rights of the plaintiff,
that they refused, on plaintiff's demand, to
deliver; and that the action was necessary for
the maintenance of plaintiff's rights. When such
is shown it is entitled to the possession of whatever interest the deceased, as tenant in common,
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had in and to the herd at the tilne of his death.
It is entitled to no nwre. It in no event wa~
entitled to the possession of the interests which
the defendants, or either of them, had in and to
the herd."
Respondent has Shepardized the Peterson case and
the case is good law and applicable to the facts before
this Court. The prorata share of the loss or waste must
be borne by the parties in accordance with their per~entage shares while the goods are in the confused mas:-:.
In the case at bar the mathematics applied b~· the
Court indicated that it found that prior to the delin-'ry
of the pipe belonging to respondent, the 501-! feet of
pipe which was owned by appellant had been reduced by
approximately 300 feet. 'Jlhis reduction in the numher
of feet was caused by a number of depleting incidents.
First, prior to the delivery of the Johnson pipe there
had been three twist-offs, the first at around 1800 feet,
the second at around 4900 feet, and the third at approxiInatel~· 5200 feet (R. 45, -!G). In addition to the twistoffs there were three or four lengths of the pipe delivered by Coveys which were so worn or defedivP as to
1nake the1n unmmble in the drilling of the well (H. 4--1-).
vVhen the well had reached the 4700-foot h_,vel it wa~
necessary to use borrowed pipe to conunen<'e drillingagain. At that time 600 feet of pipe wa:-: borrowed from
J(err-I\fcGee and used when the 4700-foot level drilling
was commenced. This fact would indicate hp:·ond douht
that at that point there had been depleted from the pipe
furnished hy Coveys a minimum of 300 feet of pipP.
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The GOO feet of 1\::err-.JleUee p1pe was used and
returned, it being marked specifically so that the smne
pipe borrowed could be returned.
It wa~ only after the twist-off~ and the losses
enumerated that respondent'~ 15~() feet of pipe was
placed on the well ~ite and u~ed in the drilling operations.
It thus appear::;; that in the confused pipe appellant
owned approxi1nately 471-! feet and respondent owned
l:lSii feet. These figure~ are tho~e used by the Court
in arriving at the proportionate losses to be sustained
by the parties. \Yhen applied the~· give us the percentage
of :2:l.17% as the prorata share of respondent, both as to
lo:-;~e:-; to be borne and as to ownership in the pipe
remaining after all losses have been deducted.
The Court in applying the percentage of losses to
be borne by the parties followed what seen1s to be the
only equitable and proper rule. The aliquote part rule
as applied to confused driH pipe is set forth in the case
of Dalton r. Bilbo, 126 Okla. 139, 258 Pac. 274, 276, one
of the cases cited hy appellant, in \vhich the following
language is set forth:

" * * * But other factors, which defendant
centends would render identification possible
( 'smue of the joints were short and some long;'
·~on1e were threaded one way and some another;'
'smne was rotten and some was good'), were not
peculiar to plaintiff's casing. There is nothing
in the record to indicate that the secondhand casSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ing of the defendant, with which the casing in controversy had been mingled, did not posses~ some
or all of the above characteristics.
"Cob by in his work on Replevin ( 2d Ed.) p.
206, says:
'' •But where the goods are mixed and
are of the same nature and value, although
not capable of an actual separation by identifying each particle, yet if a division can he
made of equal value, as in the case of oat:-:,
corn, or wheat, each part)· may claim hi~ aliquot part.'
"We believe, therefore, that the casing in
controversy did not have such distinguishing
characteristics as to take it out of the rule relating
to confusion of goods with other goods of like
character, and that the instruction wa~ properly
given."
The rule requiring forfeiture h~· a party who~l'
goods have been intermingled and confused with another
has been clearly and succinctly di~(·u~~Pd in tlw fairl~·
recent New :Mexico ca~e of Page r. Jo1u's et a/., 2(i K. "jl.
195, 190 Pac. 541, 5-!:2. There the ('OUrt in pointing out
the occasions when the forfeiture rule ~hould he applied
and distinguishing situation~ such as exi:-:t in the prP:-:Pnt
case, stated as follows:
"The rule is that where one fraudulPntl~·.
willfully, or wrongfully intermingle~ his good:-:
with those of another, so that there is no evidence
to distinguish the goods of the one from tho~e of'
the other, the party responsible for the ('Onfu~ion
forfeit:-: all his interest in thP mixture to tht- other
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party. and in the case of agents, bailees, executor~. administrators, and other trustees, occupying positions of trust and confidence, the rule as
to the confusion applies when the mixing is
merely negligent or careless. But these harsh
rules are not generally applied where the confused goods, though indistinguishable, are of
equal and nnifonn value; that is, when the mixture i~ approxinmtely honwgeneous. In such a
ea~e a~ this, the remedy i~ division in kind, or
cmnpensation for actual loss. Take, for exmnple,
the case of an administrator. Suppose he has in
his hands 100 bushels of wheat be'longing to the
estate and 100 bushels of his own. The wheat
being the same quality, it is dumped into the same
bin. There is no doubt a~ to the exact amount
contributed. It would be absurd to say that the
adn1ini:'trator should lose the hundred bushels
which he put in because of his negligence. Of
course, if the wheat was of different grade, a dif~
ferent rule would be applied, for the mixture
would not be ali of the same quality. For an
exhaustive discussion of the subject, see the case
of Claffin & Co. v. Con. J er:-;ey \Vorks, 85 Ga. 27,
11 N. E. 7:21. See, also, note to the case of A)Te
v. Hixson, Ann. Ca~. 1913E, 671. In the case of
Hesseltine. v. Stockwell, 30 Me. 237, 50 Am. Dec.
<i:27, the court said :
"'The cormnon law in opposition to the
civil law assigns the whole property, without liability to account for any part of it, to
the innocent party, when there has been a
confusion of goods, except in certain cases,
or conditions of property. ChanceUor Kent
corrertly observes that the rule is carried
no further than nEcessity requires. 2 Kent's
('om. 365.
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" 'There is therefore no forfeiture of
the goods of one who voluntarily and without fraud makes such an aillnixture. A~
when, for example, he supposes all the goods
to be his own, or when he does it by mistake.
"'And there is no forfeiture in case of
a fraudulent intermixture when the good~
intermixed are of equal value. This ha::-; not
been sufficiently noticed, and yet it is a ju:-:t
rule, and is fuHy sustained by authorit~·.
Lord Eldon, in the case of Lupton v. 'Yhi te,
15 Ves. -!42, states the law of the old decided
cases to be, 'If one man mixes his corn or
flour with that of another and they were of
equal value, the latter must have the given
quantity; but if articles of a different value
are mixed, producing a third. value, the
aggregate of the whole, and through the
fault of the person mixing them, the other
party cannot tell what wa::-; the original value
of his property; he must have the whole.'
11 his doctrine is stated with approbation by
l(ent. 2 Kent's Com. 365.'
''In thi::-; ca::-;e so far as appears from the Pvidence the sheep in question prior to the intermixing of the herd were all of the same kind,
character, and quality, so that when eonfu::-;ed, the
1nixture was approximately homogenou~. 'rhe
parties know definitely the number of sheep contributed by each to the cmnmon mas~, and tlw
loss to the common herd in justice and equity
should be shared by the parties in proportion to
their interests in the commingled goods. The
rule announced in the case of Gonzale~ v. IlfPid,
supra, practically disposes of thi~ case.
there
said:

"'"p
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·· · \ Ve agree with the trial court in its
finding that it was through the fault and
negligence of the appellant that the sheep in
question were so marked and commingled
as to render their identification impossible.
His acts led to the confusion of the goods,
but it is urged upon us that appellant's acts,
althoug·h negligent, were in no sense fraudulent or wrongful, and that he should not be
1nade to forfeit his property when the elements of willful, fraudulent, and wrongful
connningling of the property are absent. We
think this position well taken. * * *
.. · \Ve therefore hold that the court
should have pennitted appellant to recover
his proportionate share of the sheep n1arked
with appellee's earn1ark, as there was no
willful wrong nor fraud imputed to the appellant shown by the evidence nor found by the
court in its findings.·
"If it be true, as testified to by Giddings,
that the earmark in which he was required by the
contract to carry the Page sheep belonged to
him, there might not even be the element of negligence in the case. \V e think, however, that under
the undisputed facts in the ca~e the appellee was
only entitled to her proportionate part of the confused property."
X o equitable principle requires the court to give to
appellant any preference in the prorata share of the
goods to which he is entitled by reason of the fact that
he wa~ first on the scene and seized the goods. Respondent wa~ entitled to rely on the statements of Theron
('on=-~· that an arrangement concerning the cost of
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storage and sale of the confused pipe could be worked
out. It is also the law that prior seizure or replevin of
confused goods does not entitle the prior replevisor to
a priority as to his aliquote share. A case applying- thi~
principle is Ramsey v. Rodenburg, et al., 72 Colo. 567,
212 Pac. 820, 821. There was an insufficient amount of
confused wheat to restore the owners to their original
shares. The Court points out that regardlt>ss of the
sequence of action hy the owners they are onl~· entitled
to their prorata share of the whole, and any loss must
be borne equally according to the percentages owned in
the connnon mass. It

~ets

forth this principle in tlw

following language:

"It i~ conceded that, where goods are mixed
in a counnon mass by several owners, and are of
the same nature and quality, although not capable of separation b~· identification of each particle, yet, if a division can be made, as in case of
wheat, then each owner may claim his aliquote
part of the common mass and enforce his right
in an action of replevin. Wells on Replevin, ~P<'.
205; Cob bey on Replevin, ~Pe. 408; Kaufmann Y.
Schilling, 58 :\lo. 218; Gri111Ps Y. Cannell, ~:~ X eh.
187, 36 N. W. -!79.
"Counsel contends, however, that, the plaintiff having first levied his writ, and having taken
possession of the wheat, a segregation as a mattPr
of fact had already taken place by such proceeding, and that a prorating in such circumstanees
could not be had. It does not so appear to us.
Plaintiff intermixed ~-!9 bushels of his wheat with
2,101 lmslwls helongi11g· to intervener, and tlwn
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levied on 1,088 bushels. Intervener took the
ren1aining -!09 bushels of wheat, and then interYened in plaintiff's suit and denied his right to
the possession of 1,088 bushels, charging, in
effect, that the plaintiff was entitled to but 427.77
bushels, and that the intervener was entitled to
1,069.23 bushels. \Yhen the plaintiff attempted
to take wheat beyond his proportionate share, it
wa~ an attempt by him to take wheat which did
not belong to hi1n, but which did belong to the
intervener, and this question of fact, as to the
ratio the anwunt of wheat deposited in the elevator by the intervener bore to the whole mass, was
determinable in the replevin suit.
"It i~ well settled by authority that, where
grain of different owners has been intermixed in
connnon mass by an elevator or warehouse, without objection, it becomes common property, owned
by the several parties in the proportion in which
each contributed to the common mass, and the
owners n1ust sustain any loss pro rata which may
occur by diminution, decay, or otherwise. Brown
v. Northcutt, 14 Or. 529, 13 Pac. 485; Young v.
~Iiles, 20 \Vis. 623; Drudge v. Leiter, 18 Ind. App.
694, 49 X. E. 37, 63 Am. St. Rep. 359; Dole v.
Olmstead, 36 Ill. 150, 85 A1n. Dec. 397; Sexton
Y. Grahmn, 53 Iowa, 181, -! N. W. 1090; Piazzek
v. \Vhite, 23 Kan. 621, 33 Am. Rep. 211; 30 Am.
& Eng. Ency. -t-1; 40 Cyc. 407.''

These eases, as will be noted, follow without dissent
or distinction the law which was declared by Barnk v.
Peterson, supra, as the law of the State of Utah.
For further application of the confusion of goods
dortrine see Great ~~·outh~rn Gas & Oil Co. v. Logan
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Natural Gas & F'ltel Co., 155 Fed. 11-t; ~:3 CCA 57-!
( cert. den. 28 S. Ct. 256, 207 U. S. 590, 52 L. Ed. 35-!),
where the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the
confusion of goods doctrine to natural gas and allowed
the plaintiff to recover a prorata share of the gas which
was distributed through defendant's pipe line. Allowingone-sixtieth of the total amount of ga~ so distributed
where plaintiff's gas ,,·a~ mixed with the gas of sixt~·
other gas wells.
It thus appears that the Court has correctly applied
the law applicable to confusion of goods. \Ye submit
it properly refused to order that respondent forfeit any
of his interests or suffer any greater loss than hi~ prorata share of the diminution in amount of pipe which
occurred after the pipe which he owned became confused
with the pipe which was owned by the appellant ( 'oyey.

CONCLUSION
Respondent respectfully submits that
Judge Joseph G. Jeppson, has

con·ectl~·

Hi~

llonor,

found in accord-

ance with the evidence presented. Has applied the law
applicable to

confu~ion

of goods situationi" and fairly

and equitably, in accordance with the

law:-~

of the

~tate

of rtah, apportioned the depletion of the pipe between
the parties in accordance with their prorata owner~hip.
The decree fairly distributes to the partie:-~ their prorata and aliquote portion of the confused goods remaining after the lo~:::es have been distributed.
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It is, therefore, respectfully 8Ubmitted that this
Court should affinn the judg1nent of the trial court.
Respectfully subn1itted,
RA \VLINGS, \VALLACE,
ROBERTS & BLACI{,
D\YIGHT L. KING
Co ll usel for Respondent.

530 Judge Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah,
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